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The Case For Abrogation of Taxpayer Privilege
In California
Introduction
The taxpayer privilege in California was spawned in 1957 by
the California Supreme Court's anomalous construction of section
19282 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code in Webb v.
Standard Oil Co.1 The privilege retains its vitality, notwithstanding abandonment of a similar privilege in virtually all other jurisdictions. 2 This Note submits that the taxpayer privilege should be
abrogated in California in favor of a more flexible mechanism whereby state and federal tax returns would be discoverable and admissible
into evidence when they are relevant to matters being litigated. The
protective order is suggested as a vehicle to permit accommodation
of the competing confidentiality and discovery of relevant evidence
interests.

The Origin of California's Taxpayer Privilege
Webb v. Standard Oil Co.
In Webb v. Standard Oil Co.,3 a homeowner sued for the loss
of his home from a fire allegedly precipitated by malfunctioning propane gas cylinders negligently installed by the defendant. Defense
counsel sought-to discover the plaintiff's state and federal income tax
returns for use in impeaching the plaintiff's testimony on the value
of his home. 4 Plaintiff argued that section 19282 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code created a taxpayer privilege which precluded discovery of either his state or federal tax returns. Section 19282 prohibits
a member of the Franchise Tax Board or any other state official from
revealing the contents of income tax returns. 5 The California Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff and recognized the privilege as
implicit in the statute. The court's reasoning on the issue of state
returns was based on its reading of the intent of the legislature in
enacting section 19282. The court stated that the purpose of the
1. 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957).
2. See notes 48-50, 55 & accompanying text infra.
3. 49 Cal. 2d at 514, 319 P.2d at 624.
4. Id. at 510-12, 319 P.2d at 622-23.
5. CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE § 19282 (West 1970).
24 infra.
[775]
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statutory provisions barring disclosure was to encourage full and
truthful declarations in tax returns by removing the contingency that
the returns might be used against the taxpayer for other purposes. 6
The court also foreclosed discovery of the federal returns for
the same period. Its rationale as to the federal returns was that such
disclosure would be tantamount to compelling disclosure of the state
returns because the two returns contained essentially the same information.7
Aday v. Superior Court
Four years after the decision in Webb, the California Supreme
Court extended the scope of the taxpayer privilege to a corporation's
tax return in a criminal proceeding not involving prosecution for tax
violations in Aday v. Superior Court.8 A pornography dealer argued
that certain business records had not been particularly described in
a search warrant. The court found that the defendant's business'
federal and state tax returns had been properly specified but that
the forms were inadmissible because of the taxpayer privilege.9 The
court noted that the language in Revenue and Taxation Code sections
26451 to 26453(c), dealing with corporation taxes, is substantially
similar to that in the statutes interpreted in Webb to create the personal income tax privilege. 10 The Aday court, therefore, extended
Webb without analysis.
Crest Catering v. Superior Court
In 1965 in Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court," the California
Supreme Court recognized the taxpayer privilege in yet another taxation statute and addressed the new question of waiver of the privilege.12 Employees of the Crest Catering Company alleged that the
6. Id. at 513, 319 P.2d at 624.
7. Id. at 513-14, 319 P.2d at 624.
8. 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961).
9. Id. at 796-97, 362 P.2d at 51-52, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20.
10. Id.
11. 62 Cal. 2d 274, 398 P.2d 150, 42 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1965).
12. In Wilson v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1976),
the court found a waiver of the privilege in a recent case involving a negligence action
against accountants who allegedly had improperly advised the plaintiff with respect to
the tax consequences of a sale of real property. The court stated: "By her complaint,
plaintiff has placed in issue the existence and the content of her tax returns and the tax
consequences of the computations thereon. The gravamen of her lawsuit is so inconsistent with the continued assertion of the taxpayer's privilege as to compel the conclusion that the privilege has in fact been waived." See note 75 and accompanying text
infra.

Although the vehicle of waiver may be available in some cases to avoid the privi-
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company had failed to make contributions to the Employee Welfare
and Retirement Fund in accordance with the terms of the contract
between the company and the labor union. Because a fire had destroyed the firm's books and records, the defendant's employment
tax returns, submitted quarterly to the California State Department
of Employment, were the sole source of information concerning the
amount of money that should have been paid on behalf of the employees. Crest claimed that the tax returns were privileged under
sections 1094 and 2111 of the Unemployment Insurance Code.13 The
court agreed that a privilege attached but found a waiver of the
privilege in the terms of the trust agreement, incorporated by reference into the labor contract, which specified that "'[e]ach employer ... shall promptly furnish all necessary information upon demand .... "14
The employees had urged the court to recognize the waiver or,
in the alternative, to overrule Webb. Because the court found a
waiver of the privilege, it did not reach the question of whether
Webb should be overruled. The court distinguished the statutes at
issue in the two cases. It noted that the code sections relied upon
in Crest mandate that information delivered to the Department of
Employment "'shall not be open to the public, nor admissible in
evidence in any action or special proceeding . . . and shall not be
published or open to public inspection in any manner."", 5 The court
stated that "unlike the statutes considered in the Webb case, sections
1094 and 2111 leave no room for doubt that they create a privilege
.... We are therefore not persuaded that we should re-examine the
holding in the Webb case."' 6 The court thereby took notice that
when the legislature intends to create a taxpayer privilege, and not
just to regulate disclosures by taxing agency employees, it knows how
to state so directly.
Say-on Drugs v. Superior Court
In Say-on Drugs v. Superior Court,'7 yet another statute was interpreted by the California Supreme Court to create a taxpayer privilege when it would work injustice or hardship, discovery determinations assertedly
should not turn on which party has brought into issue matters appearing in tax returns
that are relevant to the dispute. Rather, relevancy should be the touchstone in discovery determinations.
13. Id. at 276, 398 P.2d at 151, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 111. See CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE §§ 1094 & 2111 (West 1956 & Supp. 1977);
14. Id. at 278, 398 P.2d at 152, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
15. Id. at 277, 398 P.2d at 151, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
16. Id. at 277, 398 P.2d at 152, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
17. 15 Cal. 3d 1, 538 P.2d 739, 123 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1975).
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lege. A class action suit had been filed against Say-on Drugs, which
collected a sales tax on the full sales price of commodities sold and
yet allegedly remitted revenues to the state on the basis of the sales
price less a deduction covering the cost of trading stamps. The
plaintiffs contended that this procedure precipitated an illegal windfall for the retailer. During the course of pretrial discovery, the
plaintiffs posed three interrogatories, seeking revelation of deductions
or adjustments that the defendant had taken in its sales tax returns
for the four year period prior to the suit.' 8 The trial court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for an order compelling the defendant to answer
the interrogatories.' 9 The California Supreme Court issued a writ
of prohibition on the ground that compelling the defendant to answer
an interrogatory on its deductions and adjustments would, by indirect
means, render "meaningless" the taxpayer privilege inherent in Revenue and Taxation Code section 7056.20 The interrogatories asking
whether defendant had utilized a particular tax form or would voluntarily make copies of his returns available to the plaintiffs were allowed because they merely "invite[d] petitioner to waive voluntarily
the privilege.."21
The court in Sav-on qualified its seemingly rigid interpretation
of the taxpayer privilege announced in Webb. In interpreting Revenue and Taxation Code section 7056, containing substantially the
same language as that in the statutes involved in Webb, 22 the court
said, 'While this statute by its terms appears to be directed only
toward administrative officers, and does not expressly establish a
privilege of the nature claimed by petitioner, it does, however, manifest a clear legislative intent that disclosures made in tax returns
shall not be indiscriminately exposed to public scrutiny."' 3 Only
indiscriminate disclosures were explicitly proscribed; this dichotomy
suggests that tax returns might be subject to discovery under appropriate circumstances.
Taxpayer Privilege: Susceptible to Attack
The Webb taxpayer privilege will be attacked by raising four
18.
19.

Id. at 3-5, 538 P.2d at 740-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
Id. at 5, 538 P.2d at 741, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 285.

20. Id. at 7, 538 P.2d at 743, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
21. Id.
22. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7056 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
"[It is unlawful for the board or any person having an administrative duty . . . to make
known in any manner . . . information pertaining to any retailer or any other person
required to report to the board or pay a tax . . . , or the amount or source of income,
profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed in any return, or to permit any return or copy thereof.., to be seen or examined by any person."
23. 15 Cal. 3d at 6, 538 P.2d at 742, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (emphasis added).
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principal contentions: (1) the Webb statutes do not give rise to
a privilege; (2) the California Evidence Code provisions relating to
evidentiary privileges proscribe the establishment of judicially conceived privileges; (3) the policy basis supporting the privilege - the
encouragement of full and truthful disclosure in income tax reporting - is not entirely sound conceptually and, in any event, may be
achieved by a less restrictive means; and (4) virtually all other jurisdictions have not provided for a taxpayer privilege.
The Statutes Involved in Webb
The court in Webb discerns a taxpayer privilege in statutory
language that facially lends no support to the court's construction of
it. At the time Webb was decided, section 19282 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, it is a misdemeanor for the Franchise Tax Board, any deputy, agent, clerk,
or other officer or employee, to disclose in any manner information as to the amount of income or any particulars set forth
24 or
disclosed in any report or return required under this part.
Present section 19282 is virtually identical to its predecessor. 25 Section 19283 creates an exception in enforcement cases: "Such information may be disclosed in accordance with proper judicial order in
cases or actions instituted for the enforcement of this part or for the
prosecution of violations of this part."26

The Webb court observed

that sections 19284 through 19287 provide for disclosure to governsituations, none of which were pertinent to
ment officials in specific
27
the facts of Webb.

The court's finding of an implicit taxpayer privilege in the statutory scheme rested on two related grounds. First, the court said, "The
wording of the quoted sections discloses an intent to preserve the
secrecy of the returns except in the few situations which are expressly
noted."28 The court apparently concluded that the language of sec-

tions 19283 to 19287 barred disclosure except under those circumstances expressly enumerated.
The court's second basis for a finding of privilege was an "expressio unius" analysis of the statutory history. The court noted
that, when the Income Tax Act of 1935 was enacted, no restriction
was placed on the promulgation of court orders permitting disclosure.
The new authorization of such orders in cases involving enforcement
24. 49 Cal. 2d at 512, 319 P.2d at 623.
25. See CAL. BEv. & TAx. CODE § 19282 (West 1970).
26. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 19283 (West 1970).
27. 49 Cal. 2d at 512, 319 P.2d at 623.
28. Id. at 512, 319 P.2d at 623-24.
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or disclosure to designated government officials indicated, therefore,
that disclosure would be permissible only in those cases specifically
29
mandated.
In concluding on two distinguishable yet related grounds that
the legislature intended to allow disclosure only under certain specified circumstances, the Webb court failed to perceive that all the
provisions in question are directed to those situations wherein govemnment officials are authorized to examine tax returns. The court
erred in construing the legislature's efforts to list circumstances under
which disclosure to certain designated officials is appropriate as an
attempt to restrict disclosure exclusively to those situations. Legislation that merely circumscribes the government official exception to
the privilege should be strictly construed. The legislature's apparent
intent in codifying the government official exceptions was to offer
guidance in implementing the statute. Its objective was assertedly
to refine and provide detail to the statutory scheme, rather than to
alter its thrust. None of the code sections construed in Webb expressly addresses the issue of whether adverse parties in a civil action can lawfully require production of income tax returns or the
information contained in them.
The provisions permitting discovery orders in specified enforcement cases pressed by government employees should be construed to
foreclose extrastatutory discovery only in the province of government
officials. This suggested limitation is supported by the notion that
a broad field of law should be covered by a statute only to the extent
that the statute purports to address that field. The provisions at issue
in Webb depart from the personal Income Tax Act of 1935 only with
respect to official disclosure, however. They do not alter the Act's
apparently unrestricted posture with respect to taxpayer-litigants.
The court's policy basis for finding an implicit privilege, the encouragement of full and truthful disclosure to the Franchise Tax
Board, is particularly puzzling. 30 An incidental or collateral purpose
to encourage full and truthful disclosure might have been gleaned
from the language of the statutes. The court's perception that the
privilege was intended to be invocable by the taxpayer as well as by
state officials, however, assertedly constitutes an attenuated construction of the statutory framework. Sections 19282 to 19287 of the Revenue and Taxation Code were conceived as common sense administrative rules designed to curb potential abuses by employees of the
Franchise Tax Board.
29. 49 Cal. 2d at 512-13, 319 P.2d at 624.
30. In Webb, this full disclosure impetus is characterized as the "primary legislative purpose" of CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE; §§ 19282-19289 (West 1970).
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The California Evidence Code
In 1965 the California legislature enacted the new California
Evidence Code, which became effective on January 1, 1967.31 Evidence Code section 351 sets out the Code's major premise: "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." 32 The Code is replete with statutory provisions included by
reference that narrow the scope of section 351; 33 the importance of
section 351, nevertheless, should not be minimized. Of this section,
one commentator has observed: "[T]he starting point in understanding the structure of the Evidence Code - and the California law of
evidence after January 1, 1967 - is section 351, which enacts the
basic proposition that all relevant evidence is admissible. All else
in the Evidence Code relates to and revolves around this basic pro34
vision."
Division 8 of the Evidence Code, sections 900 to 1070, presents
an extensive catalogue of the laws of privilege. Section 911 warrants
special attention because it discloses a legislative purpose inconsistent
with the holding in Webb. Section 911 complements section 351 by
stating that no privileges are to be invoked unless provided by statute. It states that, except pursuant to a statutory provision, "[n]o
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse
to produce any writing, object, or other thing."35 In the absence of
a statutory taxpayer privilege in the California Evidence Code, a relevant income tax return should thus be admissible into qvidence and
I
subject to the normal rules of discovery.
Evidence Code sections 351 and 911 require admission of all
relevant evidence "except as provided by statute," a phrase that does
not include decisional law. 36 The official comment to section 911
explicitly limits courts in creating new privileges: "This is one of
the few instances where the Evidence Code precludes the courts from
elaborating upon the statutory scheme. Even with respect to privileges, however, the courts to a limited extent are permitted to develop
the details of declared principles." 37
In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court,3 8 the California Su31. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299.
32. CAL. Evm. CODE § 351 (West 1970).
33. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 930-960, 1100-1157.5, 1200-1340 (West 1970
& Supp. 1977).
34. McDonough, The California Evidence Code: A Pricis, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 89,
91-92 (1966).
35. CAL. Evm. CODE § 911(b) (West 1970).
36. See CAL. EvmD. CODE § 160 (West 1970).
37. CAL. Ev. CODE § 911, Law Revision Commission Comment (West 1970).
38. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975). See notes 65-67
& accompanying text infra.
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preme Court addressed the question of whether privacy rights derived
from the California Constitution gave rise to a privilege that could
serve to shield from discovery relevant evidence in a civil suit. Plaintiff Valley Bank sought a protective order to bar discovery of bank
records, asserting the privacy rights of its depositors9 The court
rejected the assertion of privilege, stating that "it is clear that the
privileges contained in the Evidence Code are exclusive and the courts
are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy." 40
Although arising in the context of a constitutionally rather than statutorily derived claim of privilege, the foregoing language is nevertheless inconsistent with the establishment by implication of a taxpayer
privilege in Webb. A taxpayer privilege, erroneously derived by
implication from a statute, constitutes an elaboration upon the statutory scheme which is precluded by the Evidence Code. The court
has exceeded its prerogative to develop "details of declared principles;" a new principle has been announced. If the court recognizes
that Revenue and Taxation Code sections 19282 to 19289 have been
misconstrued to create a taxpayer privilege, its statutory basis, and
therefore effect, will be terminated.
The Policy Basis for a Taxpayer Privilege
The Webb court identified the principal objective of the statutes
in issue as follows:
The purpose of the amended statutory provisions prohibiting
disclosure is to facilitate tax enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in his return, without
fear that his statements will be revealed or used against him for
other purposes. If the information can be secured by forcing the
taxpayer to produce a copy of his return, the primary legislative
purpose of the secrecy provisions will be defeated.41
The court's reading of the statute's import is evident in its description
of the administrative rules in question as "secrecy provisions." 4 2 This
terminology suggests that tax returns are to be viewed as solemnly
inviolable instruments. 43 The court correctly discerned a legislative
purpose to encourage "full and truthful" tax reporting; it erred in its
determination that the application of a taxpayer privilege was a necessary incident to that purpose. As a threshold matter, the court's
39. Id. at 655, 542 P.2d at 978, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
40. Id. at 656, 542 P.2d at 978-79, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55. See Pitchess v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 539-40, 522 P.2d 305, 311, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903
(1974).
41. 49 Cal. 2d at 513, 319 P.2d at 624.
42. Id.
43. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
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notion that a taxpayer privilege actually serves to promote full and
truthful disclosure of tax matters in all situations is questionable. The
so-called "secrecy provisions" are in some cases arguably of greater
consequence in actually fostering misstatements on tax returns than
in promoting full disclosure. The result of the privilege is to ensure
that a taxpayer's return cannot be subjected to scrutiny of any sort
other than that cursorily performed by the taxing agency. If, on the
other hand, illicit matters, such as tax fraud, might be brought to light
through examination of tax returns by a third party under appropriate
circumstances, an incentive would be furnished to make full and truthful declarations.
Notwithstanding whatever impact the prospect of third party
perusal of tax returns might have on taxpayers' candor, substantial
criminal sanctions for a fraudulent filing must be viewed as a sufficient deterrent to the submission of untruthful returns. To justify
the Webb privilege solely by declaring it an inducement to do that
which is mandated by every taxation code is anomalous.
The court in Webb may have perceived a collateral purpose in
the language of the stautory scheme. This purpose can be characterized as a legislative desire to curb intrusions into citizens' personal
financial affairs made possible by government reporting requirements.
The opinion suggests an aversion to the use of government generated
evidence to taxpayers' detriment in nontax litigation.4 4 The legitimate fear that privacy interests would be unnecessarily compromised
if the privilege were discarded, however, may be addressed in a less
restrictive manner by providing for protective orders in appropriate
45
circumstances.
That lawmaking bodies and judiciaries of other jurisdictions have
not established a taxpayer privilege,4 despite for example the availability of potential constitutional or Webb-like statutory sources for
a privilege, suggests that the policy underpinnings of the California
rule are insubstantial. In view of this assertedly modest policy foundation, the California Supreme Court's liberal construction of the
statutory language in Webb to provide by implication for a taxpayer
privilege, ostensibly in the interest of advancing a compelling public
policy, is particularly striking.
The Rule in Other Jurisdictions
In interpreting the statutes in Webb to create a taxpayer privilege, the California Supreme Court has been uncharacteristically retro44. See note 41 & accompanying text supra.
45. See note 64 & accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 48-49 & accompanying text infra.
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gressive.4 7 At least sixteen states have directly confronted the issue
and have rejected the notion that taxpayer privilege should be afforded to private litigants. 45 Five states have addressed the question
by implication and have similarly rejected such a privilege. 49 Only
two state tribunals, in 1940 and 1945, have determined that a taxpayer privilege should be made available to private litigants. 50 Several of the cases involve the interpretation of statutes similar to those
in Webb. Such statutes generally bar revelation of tax returns by
government employees but are silent with regard to disclosures in the
context of private civil litigation.51
In the federal courts a taxpayer privilege has not generally been
recognized. 52 The Internal Revenue Code provides that, pursuant
to regulations approved by the President, tax returns are open to inspection by various governmental agencies and other specifically authorized parties having a legitimate interest in the subject matter. 53
47. That California stands virtually alone in providing a taxpayer privilege may
encourage forum shopping when discovery of tax returns is contemplated. See generally Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972); Application of Cepeda,
233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 139.
48. Constantine v. Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 149 So. 2d 262 (1963); Fryd Construction Corp. v. Freeman, 191 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Bailey v. Bruce,
132 Ga. App. 782, 209 S.E.2d 135 (1974); Hawkins v. Potter, 44 Ill. App. 2d 314,
194 N.E.2d 672 (1963); Bianchi v. Pattison Pontiac Co., 258 So. 2d 388 (La. App.
1972); State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Rhodes
v. Edwards, 178 Neb. 757, 135 N.W.2d 453 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965);
Currier v. Allied New Hampshire Gas Co., 101 N.H. 205, 137 A.2d 405 (1957);
Finnegan v. Coll, 59 N.J. Super. 353, 157 A.2d 737 (1960); Coleman v. Myers, 29
App. Div. 2d 727, 286 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968); Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852
(N.D. 1964); Mandell v. Yellow Cab, 13 Ohio Op. 2d 199, 170 N.E.2d 296 (C.P.
1958); Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1969) (explicitly rejected Webb);
Kine v. Forman, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 209 A.2d 1 (1965); Crane v. Tunks, 160
Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959); Mullins v. Baker, 144 W. Va. 92, 107 S.E.2d 57
(1959).
49. Thoresen v. Superior Court, 11 Ariz. App. 62, 461 P.2d 706 (1969); Karwoski
v. Rappa, 25 Conn. Supp. 147, 198 A.2d 226 (1964); Wilkerson v. Newark Diner, Inc.,
53 Del. Supp. 578, 173 A.2d 883 (Super Ct. 1961); Hedges v. Neace, 307 S.W.2d
564 (Ky. 1957); Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905
(1947).
50. Leave v. Boston Elevated Ry., 306 Mass. 391, 28 N.E.2d 483 (1940); Peterson
v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385, 17 N.W.2d 920 (1945).
51. E.g., Constantine v. Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 149 So. 2d 262 (1963); Rhodes
v. Edwards, 178 Neb. 757, 135 N.W.2d 453 (1965); Currier v. Allied New Hampshire
Gas Co., 101 N.H. 204, 137 A.2d 405 (1957); Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852
(N. Dak. 1964); Mandell v. Yellow Cab, 170 N.E.2d 296 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1958); Kine
v. Forman, 205 Pa. Super. 305, 209 A.2d 1 (1965).
52. See note 55 & accompanying text infra.
53. See I.R.C. § 6103. I.R.C. § 7213 provides for penalties for unauthorized
disclosures by government officials and by unauthorized persons receiving returns.
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The Internal Revenue Code provisions, although much more detailed,

resemble the Webb statutes to the extent that they primarily address
governmental duties with respect to the handling of tax returns. 54

One commentator concludes that the great weight of authority recommends rejection of the taxpayer privilege:
A few decisions have thought that these provisions [barring disclosure by tax officials] make copies of the return privileged and
that the taxpayer cannot be required to produce a copy of the return. There is, however, overwhelming authority to the contrary
and the matter should now be considered resolved. 55

Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly decided the taxpayer privilege issue, the accord evident in the lower
federal courts may be attributed in some measure to a Supreme Court
ruling on the question of census return privilege. In St. Regis Paper

Co. v. United States,5 6 the Court held that a federal statute, couched

in essentially the same language as section 19282 of the California
Reenue and Taxation Code, 57 barring the release of census returns
by federal officials, did not create for a private litigant a privilege
against disclosure of relevant matters contained in the returns. 58 One
significant factor leading to the Court's conclusion was that "the pro-

hibitions against disclosure contained in [the statute] run only against
the officials receiving such information and do not purport to generally clothe census information with secrecy." 59 The Court commented:
54. See I.R.C. §§ 6103 & 7213.
55.' WRGHT & MILER, 8 FEDERAL PRAcnTcE AND PROcEDURE 162-64 (1970).
In' Heathman v. United States, 503 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1974), the ninth circuit
announced: "While it is true that some lower courts have held that § 6103(a)(2),
along with 26 U.S.C. [I.R.C.] § 7213(a), reflects a public policy against disclosure
of tax returns . . . , defendants cite no case (and we have found none) which has held
that this section makes their copies of tax returns or the underlying data privileged
....
The district courts have held in numerous cases that tax returns are subject to
discovery in appropriate circumstances . . . . We hold that 26 U.S.C. [I.R.C.] §
6103(a)(2) only restricts the dissemination of tax returns by the government and that
this section does not otherwise make copies of tax returns privileged." Id. at 1035.
See also, Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th
Cir. 1975).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 apparently does not draw into question the continuing vitality of the foregoing analysis. Generally, that act codifies the manner in
which tax returns are to be treated by government agencies and their employees.
56. 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
57. 13 U.S.C. § 9, prior to its amendment, prohibited officers and employees of
the Department of Commerce from using census information for other than statistical
purposes, from making any publication of the names of those furnishing information,
and from permitting anyone outside the Department to examine the reports filed. See
note 24 & accompanying text supra.
59. Id. at 217-18.
58. 368 U.S. at 217-19.
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[W]e cannot rewrite the Census Act. It does not require petitioner to keep a copy of its report nor does it grant copies of the
report not in the hands of the Census Bureau an immunity from
legal process. Ours is the duty to avoid a construction that would
suppress otherwise competent evidence unless the statute, strictly construed, requires such a result.60

Although Congress amended the relevant statutes following St.
Regis to abrogate the rule of that case, 61 the Supreme Court's manner
of construction of a statute substantially similar to that in Webb is
nevertheless instructive. The Supreme Court in St. Regis stated that
it is not within the province of the judiciary to wrench rules from
language that does not state them.
The impact of St. Regis upon the California Supreme Court is
evident in the text of Crest.62 Although the finding of privilege in
Crest hinged on substantially broader statutory language than that
construed in Webb, rendering reconsideration of Webb for purposes
of deciding Crest nonessential, the court nevertheless raised a doubt
concerning the correctness of Webb. Chief Justice Traynor wrote in
Crest:
St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States . . . held that statutes
substantially the same as those considered in the Webb case did
not create a privilege ....
Moreover, unlike the statutes con60. Id. at 218.
61. The amendment to 13 U.S.C. § 9 provides in pertinent part that an evidentiary
privilege shall attach to census returns apparently under virtually all circumstances:
"Copies of census reports which have been so retained [by any establishment or individual] shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the
individual or establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative proceeding." The foregoing
language might be construed to reflect a legislative view that the court in St. Regis
had misperceived the prior legislative intent. This view finds support in the legislative history to the extent that the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to
perpetuate curbs which, prior to St. Regis, at least two federal courts had placed on
the prerogatives of government agencies seeking copies of census returns held by taxpayers (see [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3188 at 3189). The legislative history
does not, however, suggest that the very broad above-cited language of the amendment,
extending on its face a census return privilege to private civil litigants, reflects the
legislature's prior intent with respect to civil litigants, thus drawing into question the
court's perception of that intent in construing the statutes in St. Regis. Rather, it
would appear that the foregoing provision represents not a reassertion of prior intent
abrogated in St. Regis but an expansion of prior protection. The Senate report cites
language from Justice Black's dissenting opinion in St. Regis as indicative of its view:
"Quite plainly, . . . it is ... necessary that all the particular arms of government which
are engaged in these activities [taxation, investigation, or regulation] be bound by Government pledges." [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3188 at 3189 (quoting St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961)) (emphasis added).
62. 62 Cal. 2d at 277, 398 P.2d at 151-52, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12.
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sidered in the Webb case, sections 1094 and 2111 leave no room
for doubt that they create a privilege. Indeed, in the St. Regis
opinion itself, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
statutes similar to sections 1094 and 2111 created a privilege

.

...

63

The foregoing declarations suggest that the California Supreme Court
might embrace the United States Supreme Court's manner of statutory construction evident in St. Regis when presented with a statute
sufficiently similar to the St. Regis census code provisions in the context of a compelling case.
Protective Orders
As a general postulate, disclosure of all relevant evidence is a
manifestly desirable objective in any litigation. Competing against
the need for full disclosure of relevant evidence are the interests in
confidentiality and judicial economy, requiring that limits be placed
on the nature and extent of matters probed in a lawsuit. No useful
purpose is perceived, however, in circumscribing the scope of discovery by sustaining an inelastic taxpayer privilege which serves in
some instances to deprive factfinders of relevant evidence without
advancing by the least restrictive means the cause of protecting sensitive materials. When protection of the confidentiality interest is
required, measures provided by statute, designed specifically to prevent abuses in the disclosure process, can be utilized. Code of Civil
Procedure provisions dealing with discovery afford adequate means
by which a court can fashion protective orders to guard against nonessential revelations of legitimately confidential material. Section
2019(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with depositions on
oral examination, provides in pertinent part:

[T]he court may make an order . . . that certain matters shall
not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination shall
be limited to certain matters, books, documents, or other things,
or that the examination shall be held with no one present except
the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after
being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the
court . . . or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any
other order which justice requires to protect the0 4party or witness
from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
Section 2030(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for written
interrogatories, contains essentially the same safeguards.
63.
64.

62 Cal. 2d at 277, 398 P.2d at 151-52, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12.
CAL. Crv. Pnoc. CoDE: § 2019(b) (West Supp. 1977).
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In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court65 the California Supreme Court specifically noted that protective orders are an appropriate vehicle to limit the scope or nature of matters sought to be
discovered in cases involving confidential, private documents. The
court advocated a balancing approach in the fashioning of protective
orders and additionally placed the burden on the party seeking a
protective order to demonstrate the need for it. The court set forth
several factors to be weighed in determining the appropriate scope
of discovery: the purpose for seeking the information; the effect
that disclosure may be expected to have on the parties and on the
trial; the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure; and the ability of the court to issue an alternative order in
appropriate cases, such as a grant of partial disclosure, disclosure in
another forum, or disclosure contingent upon certain equitable considerations. 6 Given, therefore, that the court has demonstrated a
willingness to implement a balancing approach through the use of
protective orders in discovery determinations, even in the face of constitutionally imposed restraints, the same approach would seemingly
be appropriate in cases such as Webb presenting only by implication
a statutory restraint to discovery prerogatives.67
In some instances, discovery might be denied notwithstanding
relevancy. If, for example, the taxpayer demonstrated that no compelling need for discovery of the returns existed because the information contained therein was otherwise available, the court, in its discretion, could bar disclosure. 8
A 1976 case, Monstavicius v. Superior Court,6 9 illustrates one
See notes 38-40
65. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
& accompanying text supra.
66. 15 Cal. 3d at 658, 542, P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (quoting Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 382, 364 P.2d 266, 293, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 117
(1961)).
67. "Where it is possible to do so, 'the courts should impose partial limitations
rather than outright denial of discovery."' Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 983, 125 Cal. Rptr.
at 556 (quoting Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 383, 364 P.2d
Several ways to implement partial discovery
266, 280, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 104 (1961)).
are suggested, notably the sealing of information coupled with an order, pursuant to
CAL. CiV. Pnoc. CODE § 2019(b) (West 1955 & Supp. 1977), that it be opened only
upon further order of court and the holding of in camera hearings. Id. at 658, 542
P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556. See note 74 infra.
68. In a 1964 federal case, Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 484 (1964),
a similar test with respect to the discoverability of tax returns was announced. The
court, in fashioning a protective order, held that the returns should not be discoverable
unless: (1) they are clearly relevant, and (2) there is a compelling need for discovery of the returns because the information contained in them is not otherwise readily
obtainable; cf. Fulenwider v. Wheeler, 262 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1958) (trial judge has
great discretion in ruling on discoverability of tax returns).
69. Civil No. 658-132 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct., filed March 23, 1973).
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manner in which protective orders might be invoked. Plaintiffs
brought an action for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence when
a speculative investment venture promoted by the Kidder Peabody
Realty Corporation failed.70 They prayed for the recovery of the
aggregate of their separate investments in the project. Plaintiffs alleged that they relied upon defendants' statement regarding the investments long term profitability.
Defendant Kidder Peabody argued that plaintiffs had been concerned primarily with a representation in defendants' "Private Placement Memorandum," which projected substantial tax benefits from
financial reversals in the first years of the project. They asserted that
corroboration of the substantial tax benefits yielded by the investment
by inspection of the plaintiff's tax returns would be relevant in
analyzing the plaintiffs' investment sophistication and the course of
dealing between the parties prior to the agreement. 7 1 These considerations were relevant with respect to the fraud claim. Defendants
sought to show that plaintiffs not only possessed sufficient knowledge
of the speculative nature of the investment but also proceeded in a
deliberate manner and at arms-length, fully apprised of the inherent
risks.
In support of their argument, Kidder Peabody sought to compel
answers to deposition questions relating to plaintiffs' federal and
state tax returns for the relevant period. Plaintiffs asserted that the
information sought was privileged or, in the alternative, irrelevant.7
They inferred that abrogation of the privilege, or a finding that it
had been waived, would lead to indiscriminate public disclosure of
sensitive private matters unrelated to the litigation. The trial court
granted the motion to compel answers to the deposition questions,
denying the existence of the privilege. The court of appeal subsequently issued a peremptory writ of mandate, thereby recognizing
70. Complaint for Fraud, Breach of Contract, and Negligence, Monstavicius v.
Kidder Peabody Realty Corp., Civil No. 658-132 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
March 23, 1973).
71. Defendants additionally asserted that the tax returns might be relevant in
the damages determination. Plaintiffs contended that the collateral source rule foreclosed a damages inquiry into tax benefits that may have served to mitigate investment
losses.. Under the collateral source rule, compensation received by plaintiff from a
source entirely independent of the defendant tortfeasor may not be used to reduce
damages recoverable from the tortfeasor. See De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 223,
444 P.2d 342, 346, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1968); Patent Scaffolding Co. v. Williams
Construction Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (1967). Although
it is not clear whether the collateral source rule contemplates tax shelter transactions,
the court apparently embraced the rule's basic tenet. The extent of a tortfeasor's hiability should not turn on matters pertaining to indirectly related third party transactions.
72. Petition of Real Parties in Interest at 12-21, Monstavicius v. Superior Court,
Civil No. 38310 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 9, 1976).
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the privilege and sustaining it against the claim of waiver. The California Supreme Court denied a hearing for review of the appellate
court's hearing. 73
Because appropriate protective orders could have been issued,
no constructive purpose was served by denying the court access to
this information.74 A better result would have been to permit discovery pursuant to a protective order and subsequently to admit into
evidence relevant elements of plaintiffs' tax returns as those elements
reflected, albeit indirectly or incidentally, 75 the financial sophistication of plaintiffs and thereby the degree to which they had relied on
various statements made by defendant in the "Private Placement
Memorandum." The court in Monstavicius, for example, might have
permitted review only of the tax-shelter considerations appearing in
plaintiffs' returns that allegedly induced plaintiffs' participation in
the investment and that, accordingly, would have been relevant in
the fraud determination. Disclosure and use of this material, moreover, might have been restricted through issuance of a protective order to the preparation and presentation of the defendants' case. Certainly some procedure might have been formulated by the court within the framework of the above-mentioned discovery provisions so as
to afford plaintiffs optimal protection consistent with the Evidence
Code's mandate that all relevant evidence, unless privileged by statute, be admitted into evidence. 6
73. Id. (hearing denied, July 1, 1976).
74. Upon abrogation of the privilege, the vehicle of in camera inspection might
be employed by the court to shape the scope of permissible discovery. See note 67
supra.
75. In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161, 172-73, 465 P.2d
854, 862-63, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 726-27 (1970), the court presented a summary of the
liberal standards for discovery prescribed in California: "Although we have not been
able to articulate a single, comprehensive standard of relevancy, we have established
a few guidelines. Past cases make clear that the 'relevancy of the subject matter'
criterion is a broader concept than 'relevancy to the issues .

. .

. .'[C]ourts

may

appropriately give the applicant substantial leeway . . . a decision of relevance for
purposes of discovery is in no sense a determination of relevance for purposes of trial
....
[t]he relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in
accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to
relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. Given this
liberal and very flexible standard of relevancy .

. .

. [aln appellate court cannot re-

verse a trial court's grant of discovery under a 'relevancy attack' unless it concludes
that the answers . . . cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to discovery of admissible
evidence or be helpful in preparation for trial." Notably, in raising themselves the
question of their financial sophistication by filing an action alleging fraud, plaintiffs
should not have been permitted to employ a shield of privilege to thwart defendants
and the court in probing the issue. See note 12 supra.
76. See notes 32, 35 & accompanying text supra.
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Conclusion
The California Supreme Court should overrule its holding in
Webb v. Standard Oil at the earliest opportunity.77 The court in
construing Revenue and Taxation Code section 19282 announced that
a taxpayer privilege was a necessary concomitant to full and truthful
tax disclosure. The court failed to recognize that, had the legislature wished to create an evidentiary privilege, it would have articulated the proscription as it did in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 1094 and 2111, which
prohibit "public disclosure [of tax infor8
mation] in any manner."7
If Webb is overruled, tax returns would be treated like other
sensitive items of evidence. Discoverability and admissibility into
evidence would be contingent upon relevancy. Protective orders
would confine discovery within a designated sphere, bounded by
relevancy and confidentiality considerations.
Until such time as the taxpayer privilege is discarded, litigants
and courts will continue to be frustrated in their efforts in some cases
to ascertain the truth of disputed matters. Such frustration can only
benefit asserters of the privilege whose causes of action or defenses
would falter or collapse if all the relevant facts came to light.
John P. Doyle*
77. In the alternative, the legislature should take steps to change the present rule.
78. CAL. UxEm. INs. CoDE §§ 1094, 2111 (West Supp. 1977).
* A.B., 1971, Harvard College. Member, Third Year Class.

